Non-malleable asymmetric encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge are sufficient for secrecy in some domains. For example, ballot secrecy in voting. In these domains, some applications derive encryption schemes by coupling malleable ciphertexts with proofs of plaintext knowledge, without evidence that the sufficient condition (for secrecy) is satisfied nor an independent security proof (of secrecy). Consequently, it is unknown whether these applications satisfy desirable secrecy properties. In this article, we propose a generic construction for such a coupling and show that our construction produces non-malleable encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge. Furthermore, we show how our results can be used to prove ballot secrecy of voting systems. Accordingly, we facilitate the development of applications satisfying their security objectives.
Introduction
An additively-homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme allows a pair of enciphered plaintexts to be combined into a single ciphertext, such that the single ciphertext enciphers the sum of those plaintexts. Thus, homomorphic encryption allows aggregation without decryption, which is useful in many domains, including social choice theory. For example, a two-candidate voting system might instruct voters to cast asymmetric encryptions of their votes "yes" (0) or "no" (1) , and instruct the tallier to decrypt the combination of encrypted votes to reveal the number of no-votes, from which the number of yes-votes can be deduced. This system ensures ballot secrecy (when instantiated with a suitable encryption scheme), because encryption prevents votes being recovered from ballots and the tallying procedure ensures that individual votes are not revealed. 1 However, talliers and voters may cheat. Indeed, a malicious tallier many claim a spurious number of yes-and no-votes, or discard some ciphertexts under the guise that they are ill-formed (possibly after peaking inside). Moreover, a malicious voter might encrypt a negative integer to switch no-votes to yes-votes, or an integer greater than one to cast multiple no-votes. To prevent cheating, ciphertexts can be coupled with non-interactive proofs demonstrating correct ciphertext construction (to prevent claims of ill-formedness) for plaintext 0 or 1 (to prevent adversarial voters switching yes-and no-votes).
Smyth shows that building voting systems from non-malleable encryption schemes suffices for ballot secrecy [64] , moreover, Quaglia & Smyth show that such systems can be transformed into auction systems satisfying bid secrecy [57] . Furthermore, Bernhard, Pereira & Warinschi show that coupling an IND-CPA encryption scheme with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof suffices to achieve non-malleable encryption [10] . It follows that our exemplar voting system satisfies ballot secrecy (when non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are used and when the underlying encryption scheme satisfies IND-CPA). Unfortunately, results by Bernhard, Pereira & Warinschi do not apply to many encryption schemes that are used to construct voting systems, such as those proposed by Hirt [42, 43] , Damgård, Jurik & Nielsen [27, 28] , and Adida et al. [1] , as we shall now discuss.
Related work: Encryption schemes for voting systems and their shortcomings
Hirt [42, 43] proposes a construction for encryption schemes, from schemes satisfying IND-CPA, for a block of messages m 1 , . . . , m k ∈ {0, 1}, such that the homomorphic combination of messages in the block is between 1 and max:
A ciphertext c i is generated on message m i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and ciphertexts c k+1 , . . . , c k+max are generated on dummy messages m k+1 , . . . , m k+max ∈ {0, 1} such that max = k+max j=1 m j , in addition, proofs of knowledge are used to demonstrate that each ciphertext contains plaintext 0 or 1 and the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c k+max contains plaintext max, where non-interactive proofs use a common challenge derived from the ciphertexts and commitments. Concurrently, Damgård, Jurik & Nielsen [27, 28] propose a similar construction using Paillier encryption, but their work is reliant on unique identifiers to achieve non-malleability and it is unclear what security guarantees can be achieved when state is not maintained. Damgård, Jurik & Nielsen also propose an optimisation to the scheme by Hirt which reduces the number of dummy ciphertexts to one: A ciphertext c i is generated on each message m i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, as before, and a ciphertext c k+1 is generated on proofs of knowledge. Our construction is inspired by Adida et al. [1] ; it differs by including ciphertexts and block numbers in challenges, to prevent attacks. Section 3 discusses sufficient conditions for ballot secrecy and shows how our results give way to ballot-secrecy proofs for voting systems, including a variant of the Helios voting system (the original Helios system is insecure). The remaining sections present further related work ( §4) and a brief conclusion ( §5). The appendices recall cryptographic primitives and their associated security properties (Appendix A), along with a formal definition of Helios (Appendix B), and present proofs (Appendix C).
2 Non-malleable encryption with proofs of plaintext knowledge
We present our construction for non-malleable asymmetric encryption schemes on blocks of plaintexts from homomorphic encryption schemes and proofs of plaintext knowledge in a subspace as follows. (We recall definitions of an asymmetric encryption scheme, homomorphic encryption, and a non-interactive proof system, along with security definitions, in Appendix A. We also recall definitions of a sigma protocol which proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace and of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, the former also defines a subspace.)
be a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme (with respect to ternary operators , ⊕, and ⊗), ∆ = (Prove, Verify) be a non-interactive proof system derived by application of the FiatShamir transformation to a hash function and a sigma protocol that proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace (of the encryption scheme's message space), and be a positive integer. We define γ(Π, ∆, ) = (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
, where M is the subspace.
• Enc(pk , m) parses m as a block of plaintexts (m 1 , . . . , m ), chooses coins r 1 , . . . , r uniformly at random, computes
and outputs (c 1 , σ 1 , . . . , c , σ , σ).
• Dec(sk , c) parses c as (c 1 , σ 1 , . . . , c , σ , σ) and outputs (Dec Π (sk , c 1 ), . . . , Dec Π (sk , c )) if parsing succeeds and Verify((pk , c 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ c , M), σ, + 1, κ) ∧ 1≤i≤ Verify((pk , c i , M), σ i , i, κ), and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
In the above construction, observe that the message space is restricted such that for all ciphertexts (c 1 , σ 1 , . . . , c , σ , σ) output by Enc(pk , (m 1 , . . . , m )), we have ((pk , c i , M), (m 1 , r i )) is an element of the non-interactive proof system's relation, where 1 ≤ i ≤ and r i are the coins used to construct c i . Moreover,
is an element of the relation too. Hence, it follows -by completeness of the non-interactive proof systemthat schemes generated using our construction satisfy the correctness property of asymmetric encryption schemes. That is, γ constructs asymmetric encryption schemes.
Lemma 1 (Correctness). Given a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme Π, a non-interactive proof system ∆ derived by application of the Fiat-Shamir transformation to a hash function and a sigma protocol that proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace, and a positive integer , we have γ(Π, ∆, ) is an asymmetric encryption scheme.
Our proof of Lemma 1 and all further proofs appear in Appendix C. Our construction builds upon homomorphic asymmetric encryption schemes and proofs of plaintext knowledge in a subspace to enhance functionality of the resulting encryption scheme. For example, homomorphic operations can be performed on the malleable ciphertexts encapsulated in a non-malleable ciphertext. That is, given a non-malleable ciphertext (c 1 , σ 1 , , . . . , c , σ , σ), homomorphic operations can be performed on the encapsulated ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c . Moreover, if proofs σ 1 , . . . , σ are valid, then each of those ciphertexts contain plaintexts in the subspace. Furthermore, the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts, namely, c 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ c , contains a plaintext in the subspace if proof σ is valid. This enhanced functionality justifies the efficiency cost incurred from noninteractive proofs. Indeed, asymmetric encryption schemes derived using our construction are useful for privacy preserving applications and, in Section 3, we will demonstrate the applicability of our results in the context of voting systems. First, we prove that our construction produces schemes satisfying comparison based non-malleability under chosen plaintext attack (CNM-CPA) [4] . Theorem 2. Let Π be a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme, ∆ be a non-interactive proof system derived by application of the Fiat-Shamir transformation to a random oracle and a sigma protocol that proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace, and be a positive integer. If Π satisfies IND-CPA and is perfectly correct, and the sigma protocol satisfies special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge, then asymmetric encryption scheme γ(Π, ∆, ) satisfies CNM-CPA.
Bellare & Sahai have shown that CNM-CPA is equivalent to indistinguishability under a parallel chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-PA0) [4] , hence, our theorem can be equivalently stated in terms of indistinguishability.
Applications to voting
An election is a decision-making procedure to choose representatives [48, 59, 40, 2] . Choices should be made freely, and this must be ensured by voting systems [71, 53, 54] . Many voting systems rely on art, rather than science, to ensure that choices are made freely. Such systems build upon creativity and skill, rather than scientific foundations, and are routinely broken in ways that compromise free choice, e.g., [37, 13, 75, 76, 70] . Breaks can be avoided by proving that systems satisfy carefully formulated security definitions that capture voters voting freely. We use such a definition to analyse Helios.
Election schemes
We consider the class of voting systems that consist of the following four steps. First, a tallier generates a key pair. Secondly, each voter constructs and casts a ballot for their preferred candidate. Thirdly, the tallier tallies the ballots and announces a distribution of candidate preferences. Finally, voters and other interested parties check that the distribution corresponds to preferences expressed in ballots. Such systems can be formally captured by the following election scheme syntax proposed by Smyth, Frink & Clarkson [68] .
Definition 2 (Election scheme [68] ). An election scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Vote, Tally, Verify) such that:
Setup, denoted (pk , sk , mb, mc) ← Setup(κ), is run by the tallier. The algorithm takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a key pair pk , sk , a maximum number of ballots mb, and a maximum number of candidates mc.
Vote, denoted b ← Vote(pk , v, nc, κ), is run by voters. The algorithm takes as input a public key pk , a voter's vote v, some number of candidates nc, and a security parameter κ. The vote should be selected from a sequence 1, . . . , nc of candidates. The algorithm outputs a ballot b or error symbol ⊥.
Tally, denoted (v, pf ) ← Tally(sk , bb, nc, κ), is run by the tallier. The algorithm takes as input a private key sk , a bulletin board bb, some number of candidates nc, and a security parameter κ, where bb is a set. And outputs an election outcome v and a non-interactive tallying proof pf demonstrating that the outcome corresponds to votes expressed in ballots on the bulletin board. The election outcome v should be a vector of length nc such that v [v] indicates the number of votes for candidate v.
Verify, denoted s ← Verify(pk , bb, nc, v, pf , κ), is run to audit an election. The algorithm takes as input a public key pk , a bulletin board bb, some number of candidates nc, an election outcome v, a tallying proof pf , and a security parameter κ. And outputs a bit s, which is 1 if the election verifies successfully or 0 otherwise.
Election schemes must satisfy correctness: there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, integers nb and nc, and votes v 1 , . . . , v nb ∈ {1, . . . , nc}, it holds that, given a zero-filled vector v of length nc, we have:
Sufficient conditions for ballot secrecy
Smyth [64] defines ballot secrecy (Ballot-Secrecy) to capture a notion of freechoice and shows that ballot secrecy coincides with ballot independence (IND-CVA) when proofs output during tallying are zero-knowledge and when honestly constructed ballots are correctly tallied (HB-Tally-Soundness). Moreover, he shows that HB-Tally-Soundness is implied by verifiability. Hence, to prove ballot secrecy for verifiable election schemes, it suffices to prove ballot independence, assuming tallying proofs are zero-knowledge.
Definition 3 (IND-CVA [64] ). Let Γ = (Setup, Vote, Tally, Verify) be an election scheme, A be an adversary, κ be the security parameter, and IND-CVA(Γ, A, κ) be the following game.
We say Γ satisfies ballot independence or indistinguishability under chosen vote attack (IND-CVA), if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, we have
Definition 4 (Zero-knowledge tallying proofs [64] ). Let Γ = (Setup, Vote, Tally, Verify) be an election scheme. We say Γ has zero-knowledge tallying proofs, if there exists a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof system (Prove, Verify), such that for all security parameters κ, integers nc, bulletin boards bb, outputs (pk , sk , mb, mc) of Setup(κ), and outputs (v, pf ) of Tally(sk , bb, nc, κ), we have pf = Prove((pk , bb, nc, v), sk , κ; r), such that coins r are chosen uniformly at random by Tally.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be an election scheme with zero-knowledge tallying proofs. Suppose Γ satisfies HB-Tally-Soundness. We have Γ satisfies Ballot-Secrecy iff Γ satisfies IND-CVA.
A proof of Theorem 3 appears in [64] . We exploit the theorem to simplify analysis of ballot secrecy in Helios.
Suitability of Ballot-Secrecy. Discussion of ballot secrecy originates from Chaum [18] and the earliest definitions of ballot secrecy are due to Benaloh et al. [6, 7, 5] .
2 More recently, Bernhard et al. propose a series of ballot secrecy definitions [10, 66, 67, 8] . Smyth shows that these definitions do not detect vulnerabilities that arise when an adversary controls the bulletin board or the communication channel [64] . By comparison, the definition of ballot secrecy that we consider (Definition 3) detects such vulnerabilities and appears to be the strongest definition in the literature.
Case study: Helios
Helios can be informally modelled as an election scheme such that:
Setup generates a key pair for an asymmetric homomorphic encryption scheme, proves correct key generation in zero-knowledge, and outputs the key pair along with the proof.
Vote enciphers the vote to a ciphertext, proves in zero-knowledge that the ciphertext is correctly constructed and that the vote is selected from the sequence of candidates, and outputs the ciphertext coupled with the proof.
Tally selects the ballots on the bulletin board for which proofs hold, homomorphically combines the ciphertexts in those ballots, decrypts the homomorphic combination to reveal the election outcome, and announces the outcome, along with a zero-knowledge proof of correct decryption.
Verify checks the proofs and accepts the outcome if these checks succeed.
Helios was first released in 2009 as Helios 2.0, the current release is Helios 3.1.4, and a new release is planned. 3 Henceforth, we'll refer to the planned release as Helios'12.
Smyth proves that neither Helios 2.0 nor Helios 3. A proof of Theorem 4 appears in Appendix C.3. Smyth also presents a proof [64] . These proofs are different in structure. In particular, we exploit Theorem 2 to simplify our proof, which allows us to present our proof in just two pages, whereas Smyth required five.
Further related work
In complimentary work, constructions for IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2 secure encryption schemes from schemes satisfying IND-CPA have been presented. Naor & Yung [51] propose a construction for IND-CCA1 encryption schemes from IND-CPA schemes by encrypting each plaintext twice and using a proof of knowledge to demonstrate that both ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintext, moreover, Sahai [60] defines additional conditions to achieve IND-CCA2 security and efficient variants which maintain IND-CCA2 security are known, e.g., [49, 9] . Cramer & Shoup [26] derive IND-CCA2 secure encryption schemes from IND-CPA schemes using "universal hash proof systems," furthermore, efficient constructions have been shown, e.g., [25, 26, 29] . Elkind & Sahai [32] have shown that the techniques by Naor & Yung and Cramer & Shoup are special cases of a more general paradigm: given an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme (where "ill-formed" ciphertexts are indistinguishable from "well-formed" ciphertexts), an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme can be constructed by coupling ciphertexts with "proofs of well-formedness." Fujisaki & Okamoto [34] derive IND-CCA2 secure encryption schemes from probabilistic trapdoor one-way functions satisfying IND-CPA (such as El Gamal). Canetti, Halevi & Katz [15] derive IND-CCA2 encryption schemes from IND-CPA secure identity-based encryption schemes and more efficient variants are known, e.g., [12, 14, 11] . These results are orthogonal to our work, since we explicitly focus on schemes using proofs of knowledge to achieve additional security properties. The aforementioned schemes do not.
Discussion of ballot independence originates from Gennaro [35] and the relationship with ballot secrecy has been explored: Benaloh shows that a simplified version of his voting system allows the administrator's private key to be recovered by an adversary who casts a ballot as a function of other voters' ballots [ [22, 21] discuss how malleable ballots can be abused to compromise ballot secrecy. The first definition of ballot independence seems to be due to Smyth & Bernhard [66, 67] , moreover, they formally prove relations between their definitions of secrecy and independence. Independence has also been studied beyond elections, e.g., [19] , and the possibility of compromising security in the absence of independence has been considered, e.g., [20, 56, 55, 30, 31, 36] .
An earlier version of our construction appeared in [69] . In that work, we considered a construction from a sigma protocol, rather than a non-interactive proof system derived from a sigma protocol and a hash function. This overcomplicated the construction and proofs. Thus, this work improves upon our earlier work by considerably simplifying results. Moreover, we have used our results to prove that a variant of Helios satisfies ballot secrecy, whereas our earlier work did not include such a proof.
Conclusion
We deliver a generic construction for non-malleable asymmetric encryption schemes from homomorphic schemes coupled with proofs of knowledge. The proofs of knowledge enhance functionality. In particular, an observer can check that ciphertexts contain plaintexts from a particular message space, without the private key. Moreover, homomorphic operations can be performed on the malleable ciphertexts embedded in non-malleable ciphertexts. We believe that the enhanced functionality justifies the efficiency cost. Indeed, such functionality has proven to be particularly useful in secret, verifiable voting systems.
A Cryptographic primitives A.1 Asymmetric encryption
Definition 5 (Asymmetric encryption scheme [44] ). An asymmetric encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec), such that:
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• Gen, denoted (pk , sk , m) ← Gen(κ), inputs a security parameter κ and outputs a key pair (pk , sk ) and message space m.
• Enc, denoted c ← Enc(pk , m), inputs a public key pk and message m ∈ m, and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec, denoted m ← Dec(sk , c), inputs a private key sk and ciphertext c, and outputs a message m or an error symbol. We assume Dec is deterministic.
Moreover, the scheme must be correct: there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ and messages m, we have
. A scheme has perfect correctness if the probability is 1.
Definition 6 (Homomorphic encryption [68] ). An asymmetric encryption scheme Γ = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is homomorphic, with respect to ternary operators , ⊕, and ⊗, 6 if there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, we have the following.
7 (IND-CPA [3] ). Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an asymmetric encryption scheme, A be an adversary, κ be the security parameter, and IND-CPA(Π, A, κ) be the following game.
In the above game, we require m 0 , m 1 ∈ m and |m 0 | = |m 1 |. We say Γ satisfies IND-CPA, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, we have Succ(IND-CPA(Π, A, κ)) ≤ 1/2 + negl(κ).
Definition 8 (IND-PA0 [4]
). Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an asymmetric encryption scheme, A be an adversary, κ be the security parameter, and IND-PA0(Π, A, κ) be the following game.
IND-PA0(Π, A, κ) = 6 We shall implicitly bind ternary operators occasionally, i.e., we write Γ is a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme as opposed to the more verbose Γ is a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme, with respect to ternary operators , ⊕, and ⊗. 7 We write X • pk Y for the application of ternary operator • to inputs X, Y , and pk . We occasionally abbreviate X • pk Y as X • Y , when pk is clear from the context. 8 Our definition of an asymmetric encryption scheme explicitly defines the plaintext space, whereas, Bellare et al. [3] leave the plaintext space implicit; this change is reflected in our definition of IND-CPA. Moreover, we provide the adversary with the message space and security parameter. We adapt IND-PA0 similarly.
In the above game, we require m 0 , m 1 ∈ m and |m 0 | = |m 1 |. We say Γ satisfies IND-PA0, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, we have Succ(IND-PA0(Π, A, κ)) ≤ 1/2 + negl(κ).
A.2 Proof systems
Definition 9 (from [68] ). Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme and Σ be a sigma protocol for a binary relation R.
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• Σ proves correct key generation if a ((κ, pk , m), (sk , s)) ∈ R ⇔ (pk , sk , m) = Gen(κ; s).
Further, suppose that (pk , sk , m) is the output of Gen(κ; s), for some security parameter κ and coins s.
• Σ proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace if ((pk , c, m ), (m, r)) ∈ R ⇔ c = Enc(pk , m; r) ∧ m ∈ m ∧ m ⊆ m. We call m the subspace.
• Σ proves correct decryption if ((pk , c, m), sk ) ∈ R ⇔ m = Dec(sk , c).
Definition 10 (Non-interactive proof system [68] ). A non-interactive proof system for a relation R is a tuple of algorithms (Prove, Verify), such that:
• Prove, denoted σ ← Prove(s, w, κ), is executed by a prover to prove (s, w) ∈ R.
• Verify, denoted v ← Verify(s, σ, κ), is executed by anyone to check the validity of a proof. We assume Verify is deterministic.
Moreover, the system must be complete: there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all statement and witnesses (s, w) ∈ R and security parameters κ,
Definition 11 (Fiat-Shamir transformation [33] ). Given a sigma protocol Σ = (Comm, Chal, Resp, Verify Σ ) for relation R and a hash function H, the FiatShamir transformation, denoted FS(Σ, H), is the tuple (Prove, Verify) of algorithms, defined as follows:
9 Given a binary relation R, we write ((s 1 , . . . , s l ), (w 1 , . . . , w k )) ∈ R ⇔ P (s 1 , . . . , s l , w 1 , . . . , w k ) for (s, w) ∈ R ⇔ P (s 1 , . . . , s l , w 1 , . . . , w k ) ∧ s = (s 1 , . . . , s l ) ∧ w = (w 1 , . . . , w k ), hence, R is only defined over pairs of vectors of lengths l and k.
Prove(s, w, κ) = (comm, t) ← Comm(s, w, κ); chal ← H(comm, s); resp ← Resp(chal, t, κ); return (comm, resp); Verify(s, (comm, resp), κ) = chal ← H(comm, s); return Verify Σ (s, (comm, chal, resp), κ); A string m can be included in the hashes computed by algorithms Prove and Verify. That is, the hashes are computed in both algorithms as chal ← H(comm, s, m). We write Prove(s, w, m, κ) and Verify(s, (comm, resp), m, k) for invocations of Prove and Verify which include string m.
Definition 12 (Zero-knowledge [57] ). Let ∆ = (Prove, Verify) be a non-interactive proof system for a relation R, derived by application of the Fiat-Shamir transformation [33] to a random oracle H and a sigma protocol. Moreover, let S be an algorithm, A be an adversary, κ be a security parameter, and ZK(∆, A, H, S, κ) be the following game.
ZK(∆, A, H, S, κ)
Oracle P is defined on inputs (s, w) ∈ R as follows:
• P(s, w) computes if β = 0 then σ ← Prove(s, w, κ) else σ ← S(s, κ) and outputs σ.
And algorithm S can patch random oracle H. 10 We say ∆ satisfies zeroknowledge, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S, such that for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl, and for all security parameters κ, we have Succ(ZK(∆, A, H, S, κ)) ≤ 1 2 +negl(κ). An algorithm S for which zero-knowledge holds is called a simulator for (Prove, Verify).
Definition 13 (Simulation sound extractability [68, 10, 39] ). Suppose Σ is a sigma protocol for relation R, H is a random oracle, and (Prove, Verify) is a noninteractive proof system, such that FS(Σ, H) = (Prove, Verify). Further suppose S is a simulator for (Prove, Verify) and H can be patched by S. Proof system (Prove, Verify) satisfies simulation sound extractability if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm K, such that for all probabilistic polynomialtime adversaries A and coins r, there exists a negligible function negl, such that for all security parameters κ, we have:
where A(-; r) denotes running adversary A with an empty input and coins r, where H is a transcript of the random oracle's input and output, and where oracles A and P are defined below:
• A (). Computes Q ← A(-; r), forwarding any of A's oracle queries to K, and outputs Q . By running A(-; r), K is rewinding the adversary.
• P(s). Computes σ ← S(s); P ← (P [1] , . . . , P[|P|], (s, σ)) and outputs σ.
Algorithm K is an extractor for (Prove, Verify).
Theorem 5 (from [10] ). Let Σ be a sigma protocol for relation R, and let H be a random oracle. Suppose Σ satisfies special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge. Non-interactive proof system FS(Σ, H) satisfies zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractability.
B Helios
Smyth, Frink & Clarkson [68] formalise a generic construction for Helios-like election schemes (Definition 14), which can be instantiated to derive Helios'16 (Definition 15).
Definition 14 (Generalised Helios [68] ). Suppose Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is an additively homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme, Σ 1 is a sigma protocol that proves correct key generation, Σ 2 is a sigma protocol that proves plaintext knowledge in a subspace, Σ 3 is a sigma protocol that proves correct decryption, and H is a hash function. Let FS(Σ 1 , H) = (ProveKey, VerKey), FS(Σ 2 , H) = (ProveCiph, VerCiph), and FS(Σ 3 , H) = (ProveDec, VerDec). We define election scheme generalised Helios, denoted Helios(Π, Σ 1 , Σ 2 , Σ 3 , H) = (Setup, Vote, Tally, Verify), as follows.
• Setup(κ). Select coins s uniformly at random, compute (pk , sk , m) ← Gen(κ; s); ρ ← ProveKey((κ, pk , m), (sk , s), κ); pk ← (pk , m, ρ); sk ← (pk , sk ), let m be the largest integer such that {0, . . . , m} ⊆ {0}∪m, and output (pk , sk , m, m).
• Vote(pk , v, nc, κ). Parse pk as a vector (pk , m, ρ). Output ⊥ if parsing fails or VerKey((κ, pk , m), ρ, κ) = 1 ∨ v ∈ {1, . . . , nc}. Select coins r 1 , . . . , r nc−1 uniformly at random and compute:
Output ballot (c 1 , . . . , c nc−1 , σ 1 , . . . , σ nc ).
• Tally 
• Verify(pk , bb, nc, v, pf , κ). Parse v as a vector of length nc, parse pf as a vector of length nc − 1, parse pk as a vector (pk , m, ρ). Output 0 if parsing fails or VerKey((κ, pk , m), ρ, κ) = 1. Let {b 1 , . . . , b } be the largest subset of bb satisfying the conditions given by the tally algorithm and let mb be the largest integer such that {0, . . . , mb} ⊆ m.
The above algorithms assume nc > 1. Smyth, Frink & Clarkson define special cases of Vote, Tally and Verify when nc = 1. We omit those cases for brevity and, henceforth, assume nc is always greater than one.
Definition 15 (Helios'16 [68] ). Election scheme Helios'16 is Helios(Π, Σ 1 , Σ 2 , Σ 3 , H), where Π is additively homomorphic El Gamal [24, §2] , Σ 1 is the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of discrete logarithms by Chaum et al. [16, Protocol 2] , Σ 2 is the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of disjunctive equality between discrete logarithms by Cramer et al. [23, Figure 1 ], Σ 3 is the sigma protocol for proving knowledge of equality between discrete logarithms by Chaum & Pedersen [17, §3.2] , and H is a random oracle.
Although Helios actually uses SHA-256 [52] , we assume that H is a random oracle to prove Theorem 4. Moreover, we assume the sigma protocols used by Helios'16 satisfy the preconditions of generalised Helios, that is, [16, Protocol 2] is a sigma protocol for proving correct key generation, [23, Figure 1 ] is a sigma protocol for proving plaintext knowledge in a subspace, and [17, §3.2] is a sigma protocol for proving decryption. We leave formally proving this assumption as future work.
C Proofs C.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (correctness)
Let Π = (Gen Π , Enc Π , Dec Π ), ∆ = (Prove, Verify), and γ(Π, ∆, ) = (Gen, sk , c 1 ) , . . . , Dec Π (sk , c )), with overwhelming probability. And, by correctness of Π, we have (Dec Π (sk , c 1 ) , . . . , Dec Π (sk , c )) = m, with overwhelming probability. Thereby concluding our proof.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (non-malleability)
Let Π = (Gen Π , Enc Π , Dec Π ), ∆ = (Prove, Verify), and Γ = γ(Π, ∆, ) = (Gen, Enc, Dec). Moreover, let M be the subspace used by ∆. Proof system ∆ satisfies zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractability, because the underlying sigma protocol satisfies special soundness and special honest verifier zeroknowledge (Theorem 5). Hence, there exists a simulator S and a extractor K for ∆. Suppose Γ does not satisfy CNM-CPA. Hence, Γ does not satisfy IND-PA0 either [4] , and there exists an adversary that wins IND-PA0 against Γ. We proceed with a sequence of games. c as vector (c 1 , . . . , c |c| ) . Initialises m as a vector of length |c| and Q as an empty vector. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , |c|} process c i as follows: if ciphertext c i is a valid ciphertext, i.e., c i is a vector of length 2 · + 1 and all its proofs hold,
Initialise H as a transcript of the random oracle's input and output, and P as a transcript of simulated proofs. Compute
We prove that games G and IND-PA0 are equivalent. By simulation sound extractability, we have for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |c|}, if c i is a valid ciphertext, then for all j ∈ {1, . . . , } there exists a message m i,j and coins
, with overwhelming probability. Hence, Q is a tuple of statements and proofs for ciphertexts embedded in valid ciphertexts, and W contains the corresponding witnesses, i.e., pairs of messages and coins. It follows that Game G computes m[i] as the plaintext corresponding to ciphertext c i , for valid ciphertexts, with overwhelming probability. Moreover, although ciphertexts constructed using Enc Π may not have been constructed using coins chosen uniformly at random, we nevertheless have that game IND-PA0 also computes m[i] as the plaintext corresponding to ciphertext c i , because Π is perfectly correct. Thus, games G and IND-PA0 are equivalent. Since there exists an adversary that wins IND-PA0 against Γ, there must also exist an adversary A that wins G against Γ, i.e., for all negligible functions negl, there exists a security parameter κ such that (Γ, A, κ) ).
C.2.2 Hybrid games.
Let G0, respectively G1, be the game derived from G by replacing β ← R {0, 1} with β ← 0, respectively β ← 1. These games are trivially related to G, namely,
We define hybrid games H 1 , . . . , H such that H i is derived from G0 by replacing c ← Enc(pk , m β ) with c ← Enc(pk , (m 1 [1] , . . . , m
). It follows that a ciphertext is computed for plaintext m 0 in both G0(Γ, A, κ) and
Let G1:0 be the game derived from G1 by replacing g = β with g = 0. These games are trivially related, namely, Succ(G1(Γ, A, κ)) = 1 − Succ(G1:0(Γ, A, κ)). Moreover, we have
because a ciphertext is computed for plaintext m 1 in both G1:0 and H . It follows that
which can be rewritten as a telescoping series
is the largest term in the series, where 1 ≤ ι < . Thus,
Moreover, since adversary A wins G against Γ, we have
Seeking a contradiction, we use A to construct an adversary that wins IND-CPA against Π.
C.2.3 Simulate proofs.
Let B be an adversary against IND-CPA that simulates A's challenger by embedding its challenge ciphertext as the ιth ciphertext in the challenge ciphertext it computes for A. Moreover, the adversary exploits simulator S to simulate the proof corresponding to the ιth ciphertext and to simulate the proof corresponding to the homomorphic combination of ciphertexts: B(c ι ) picks coins r 1 , . . . , r ι−1 , r ι+1 , . . . , r , computes
and outputs g. , σ 1 , . . . , c , σ ) simulates the ciphertext constructed by A's challenger in H ι , otherwise, it simulates the ciphertext in H ι+1 , with overwhelming probability. Using a similar argument, the plaintexts computed by B and input to A simulate the plaintexts constructed by A's challenger in H ι if β = 0 and in H ι+1 otherwise, with overwhelming probability. Suppose B outputs g. Hence, either
• β = 0 and B(c ι ) simulates the challenger in H ι , thus g = β with at least the probability that A wins H ι ; or
• β = 1 and B(c ι ) simulates the challenger in H ι+1 , thus, g = β with at least the probability that A looses H ι+1 and, since A wins game G, we have g is a bit, hence, g = β.
It follows that Succ(IND-CPA(Π, B, κ)) is at least (Γ, A, κ) )), hence, by (1), we have
thereby deriving a contradiction and concluding our proof. We prove that B that wins IND-PA0 against our construction γ.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4 (ballot secrecy)
Let γ(Π, FS(Σ 2 , H), ) = (Gen, Enc, Dec), for some integer that we will specify later. Moreover, let m be Π's message space. Suppose (pk , sk , m ) is an output of Gen(κ) and ρ is an output of S((κ, pk , m), κ). Let pk = (pk , m, ρ). Further suppose (v 0 , v 1 , nc) is an output of A(pk , κ). Since S is a simulator for FS(Σ 1 , H), we have B simulates the challenger in IND-CVA to A. In particular, pk is a triple containing a public key and corresponding message space generated by Gen Π , and a (simulated) proof of correct key generation. Let us now specify that = nc − 1. Moreover, let β ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose (m 0 , m 1 ) is an output of B(pk , m, κ) and c is an output of Enc(pk , m β ). 
